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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN BOWMAN, HENRY J. 
BOWMAN, SARA JUNE PETTER-
SON, and MICHAEL BOWMAN, 




JOHN DUSSAULT, DOROTHY 
DUSSAULT and DONALD 
BOWMAN, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by beneficiaries of the Marie Doro-
thy Wattis Trust against the defendants, Trustees of the Marie 
Dorothy Wattis Trust, claiming damage for mismanagement 
of the Trust estate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents, after a four day trial before the court sitting 
without a jury, were granted judgment against appellants 
John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault for the sum of $143, 
526.03; and judgment against Donald Bowman in the sum of 
$11,318.91. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault seek 
reversal of the judgment entered against them, Respondents 
seek affirmance. 
I Case No. 
I 13657 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In large measure we agree with the statement of facts 
set out by appellants. However, in several areas that state-
ment sets forth evidence most favorable to appellants, rath-
er than facts resolved by the Trial Court upon conflicting 
evidence. We do therefore controvert and supplement the 
statement of facts in these particulars. 
The trust agreement (R-3) does not contain exculpatory 
language absolving the Trustees. There is a broad grant of 
powers, (Article 8), and specific provisions the Trustees are 
not to be liable in respect of securities held in the Trust (i.e., 
calls or assessments), and a further provision in the pow-
ers article the acts of the Trustees in good faith are conclus-
ive, and third persons dealing with the trust are thereby un-
der no duty to inquire as to actual powers. Nowhere do you 
find exculpatory language in the Trust instrument. 
Mrs. Bowman was not the Trustor, merely a life benefi-
ciary, and had no powers to invade the Trust; or direct it 
other than as one of three Trustees (R-190). 
No witness was called to support Dussault's claims that 
he believed margin investment proper, and had so been ad-
vised by attorneys and brokers. Yet we do have a letter to 
Dussault from the author of the Trust, Attorney Bridges, 
(Ex. H) that is a lengthy analysis of the trustees powers, yet 
limits them specifically to usual investment practices. 
Dussault by 1965 (prior to the acts here complained of) 
was a knowledgeable investor, investing large sums of his 
own money in the stock market (Ex. S), and fully appreciat-
ed the significance of diversification, margin investments, 
speculative stocks, and the propriety of his actions as trus-
tee (R-191). 
At the time of the actions here complained of, Mrs. Bow-
2 
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man was incompetent and unable to handle her affairs (R-
192.) 
At no time was the administration of the trust moved 
to Commercial Security Bank in Ogden (App. Brief Pg. 7); 
at all times here involved it was with Dussault's accountants, 
Essary, Dal Porto and Lowe, in Sacramento. 
Robert Jeavons testified ratings on stocks and bonds 
range from A-plus (highest) to C (lowest). B-plus is aver-
age in such ratings (R-349). In the portfolio here involved 
(seven) two were not rated, three were below average, one 
average, and only one was above average (Ex. N). 
The breach of fiduciary duty by the Dussaults was gross 
inattentiveness constituting bad faith (R-197) entitling plaint-
iffs to punitive damage. 
The expert witness called by plaintiffs, Robert Jeavons, 
testified flatly the investment practices of the defendants 
were improper and further that margin purchasing was nev-
er acceptable in trust management (R-354). 
Appellants' brief states (Pg. 6) that "as a result of mar-
gin purchasing the value of the estate was increased in 1967 
to $442,000.00. During the next several years, however, as 
investments were made on margin, the trust diminished.,, 
"Diminished" is not really an accurate portrayal of what hap-
pened to this Trust. Eliminating the Reno property (which 
is still in the Trust) the 1967 position (Ex. C, statement of 
1-10-68) showed assets of $501,000.00 less debts of $113,-
000.00 (only $44,000.00 of which was margin) or a net po-
sition of $388,000.00 for security assets other than the real 
property. Over the next three years, income from dividends, 
interest and rentals was $85,300.00. During this same period 
expenses (exclusive of interest paid on margin accounts but 
including all operating expenses, taxes, and all payments to 
3 
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the life beneficiary, Mrs Bowman) were $39,100.00 (Ex. C, 
statements of 2-18-69, 1-20-70, and 2-16-71). The net operating 
gain, disregarding the improper margin investment, was $46,-
200.00. Yet during this time the value of the trust, exclusive 
of the real estate, declined from $388,00.00 to $51,600.00, 
(Ex. C, statement of 10-11-71), a loss of over $336,000.00. 
P O I N T I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
LIABILITY AGAINST THE APPELLANTS FOR 
TRUST MISMANAGEMENT. 
The Appellants primary approach in POINT I of their 
brief is that the language of the trust instrument coupled 
with Sections 33-21-1 and 33-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
and this Court's decision in Dipo vs. Dipo, 536 P. 2d 923, 
(1974) should exonerate the Appellants for their acts of mis-
management of the trust. The Appellants argument is brok-
en into three basic areas and we will attempt to answer their 
arguments in as chronological a manner as possible. 
First: Respondents feel that the case of Dipo vs. Dipo, 
supra is not applicable in connection with this appeal. The 
plaintiff in the Dipo case brought the action to enjoin the 
defendants from purchasing stocks in certain corporations. 
He based his argument on two points, to-wit (1) that the 
trustees did not have the power to make such a purchase 
and (2) that if the stock was purchased the trustees could 
manage the property so as to deprive the plaintiff of income. 
This Court held that the trustees did have the powers to pur-
chase the stocks, but also found that at that time any pos-
sible economic loss to the beneficiary was mere conjecture. 
This Courts specific language was as follows: 
"It is his contention that Doris and George could 
so manipulate the affairs of the corporations to pre-
vent the declaration of dividends, thus depriving him 
4 
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of any income from the proposed transaction. This 
is mere conjecture. If Doris and George should so 
act in bad faith, David would have redress to the 
Courts for appropriate relief. (At page 926) (Empha-
sis added). 
In the case now before this Court the Appellees are now 
in the situation which David was attempting to avoid in the 
Dipo case. The mismanagement has accrued, the bad faith has 
been found and the Appellees are asking redress of this 
Court, said right having been reserved to them through the 
above language in the Dipo case. 
We do not believe that even the Appellants contend that 
the Dipo case and Sec. 33-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
will exonerate them from the effects of "bad faith" in the 
management of the trust. The trust agreement includes in 
the latter portion of Article VIII, to-wit: 
"and all their acts in good faith hereunder shall be 
conclusive on all parties in interest," (Emphasis add-
ed) 
In addition this Court has held that a trust agreement per-
mitting acts in bad faith is against public policy and will not 
be followed. Wallich vs. Wallich 18 Utah 2d 240, 420 P.2d 
40 (1966). 
The Appellants note on page 19 of their brief that "Mar-
gin investments are not against public policy and are not 
illegal and are common in the investment market." We have 
no argument with this statement as it applies to investments 
in general. However, the citations relied upon by the Appel-
lants appear to relate to investments in general and not to 
investments of trust funds. With reference to the propriety 
of investing trust funds, margin, and in speculative stock, we 
draw this Court's attention to the following case and authori-
ties: 
"On the other hand, certain kinds of investments are 
5 
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universally condemned. It is improper for a trustee 
to purchase securities for the purpose of specula-
tion, although the line between what constitutes 
speculation and what constitutes a businessman's risk 
and what constitutes a prudent investment is drawn 
in different places by different courts. It is clear 
of course that a trustee cannot properly purchase 
securities on margin; (1) nor can he properly pur-
chase speculative shares of stock (2) or bonds sell-
ing at a large discount because of uncertainty as 
to whether they will be paid at maturity. (3) 
Scott on Trusts, Third Edition, Sec. 227.6, Vol. Ill 
page 1816. 
"Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the 
trust, the following are not proper trust investments: 
(1) purchase of securities for purposes of specula-
tion, for example, purchases of shares of stock on 
margin or purchase of bonds selling at a great dis-
count because of uncertainty whether they will be 
paid on maturity; (2) purchase of securities in new 
and untried enterprises; (3) employment of trust 
property in the carrying on of trade or business; 
(4) purchase of land or other things for resale." 
Restatement of Trusts 2d Sec. 227 (f) 
"TAXIS, P. J., November 2, 1961 . - . . . In exam-
ining the present account, one matter need be dis-
cussed. Several entries in this account seem to in-
dicate quite clearly that the executors have been 
purchasing securities on margin. This is improper 
fiduciary action. Cf. Restatement of Trusts 2d Sec. 
227, comment (3); English v. Mclntyre, 51 N.Y.S. 
697 (App. Div., 1898); In re Hirsch's Estate, 101 
N.Y.S. 893 (App. Div., 1906)" Shaner Estate, 
(Pennsylvania) 26D & C 2d 450 (1961) 
SECOND: The trial Court found the Appellants guilty 
of bad faith (R. 193, 197, 562, 576), but the Appellants con-
tend that that finding is erroneous. John Dussault testified 
that he requested opinions from both Dean Witter & Company 
6 
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and Glore-Forgan in connection with the purchase of stocks 
on margin and he testified that both companies said that it 
was permissible (R. 442). It is interesting to note that he 
sought this advice from stock brokerage firms that could 
gain substantial commissions from an actively trading mar-
gin account as opposed to an independent attorney. Appellees 
contend that relying upon non-independent stock brokers for 
legal opinions is in itself equivalent to bad faith. It would 
also seem that as important as this issue could be to the out-
come of the trial that Mr. Dussault would have provided at 
trial some documentation of the opinions from these brok-
erage firms. We do acknowledge that an opinion was request-
ed of Mr. Robert L. Bridges, by Mr. and Mrs. Dussault con-
cerning the investment of trust funds in equities or realty. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit H). The opinion received by the Dussaults 
was that the trustees had broad investment powers, but we 
specifically note the comments made on page 5 of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit H as follows: 
"With respect to the formation of the trust our notes 
do not show any intent to deviate from normal in-
vestment policy excepting only the special provision 
relating to stock in Utah Construction Company not-
ed above." 
Appellants have cited no case showing it was normal invest-
ment policy to invest trust funds in speculative stocks and 
on margin. To the contrary, the Restatement of Trusts, su-
pra, and Scott On Trusts, supra, specifically say it should not 
be done. 
THIRD: The trust instrument executed by Mrs. Wattis 
did not state in specific terms that the trustees could specu-
late with the trust funds. The trust language was in the terms 
of investing, and the Appellees contend that to speculate is 
not to invest. A very distinct difference must be drawn be-
tween an investment and a speculation. Such a distinction was 
7 
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very well reasoned by Judge Hannay in the case of Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 
373 (S. D. Texas) (1965). Judge Hannay distinguished an 
investment from a speculation, at 379 and then went on to 
hold at p. 380 as follows: 
"As discussed in the last question, a short sale trans-
action is a margin account and as such is not an in-
vestment but is a speculation." 
All of the relevant material in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, supra, as it relates to the 
case at bar is too voluminous to reprint here but should be 
read in its entirety. It should also be noted that Judge Han-
nay applied Texas law in his decision and that Texas had 
enacted the "Prudent man rule" in substantially the same form 
as the State of Utah, Vernon's Civil Statutes of the State of 
Texas, Art. 7425 b-46A, and that paragraph 'B' of Art 7425 
b-46 is substantially identical to Sec. 33-2-2 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
In conclusion it should be noted that after hearing all 
of the evidence presented at trial Judge Wahlquist conclud-
ed as follows: 
"Dishonesty only to the extent that he knew this 
wasn't the way that he was supposed to run a trust, 
by then. That is the first thing he knew? and the sec-
ond thing is that he knew what he was doing was 
the best thing for him and not the best thing for the 
William Bowman family or to his mother-in-law, and 
I think he also knew, and as far as I am able to as-
certain, that it wasn't the best thing for Donald Bow-
man, but that it was the best thing for him." 
Dealing in trust funds for your own interests and to 
the exclusion of the interests of other beneficiaries must be 
bad faith, especially when the economic needs of the benefi-
ciaries differ as they did in this case. (R-570-571). 
8 
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P O I N T II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF 
CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS IN THE 1960'S, NOR 
WAS IT IN ERROR TO FIND THEM TO BE POOR IN-
VESTMENTS, PARTICULARLY FOR TRUSTS. 
FIRST: On page 23 of the Appellant's brief they state 
that "The trial Judge stated the source of judicial notice to 
be 'a recent reading of the Wall Street Journal'." (Emphasis 
added). A close reading of the last line of page 361 of the 
trial .transcript will show that the term recent should have 
been "chronic". 
SECOND: The unrebutted trial testimony of Mr. Robert 
Jeavons is basically as follows: 
A. Mr. Jeavons received a Bachelors Degree in econo-
mics from Dartmouth College in 1948 and a Law Degree from 
Western Reserve University Law School in 1951 (R. 343) 
B. From 1948 to 1955 he worked for the Cleveland 
Trust Company in the tax area, investment area and ultimate-
ly as a trust administrator. (R. 343, 381) 
C. From 1957 to, 1969 he worked in various positions 
with Standard and Poor. (R. 344, 345) 
D. From 1969 to 1973 Mr. Jeavons worked in the invest-
ment division of the Trust Department of the Central Bank 
and Trust Company of Denver. (R. 345) 
E. Mr. Jeavons testified that the rating of storks by 
Standard and Poor was from A-plus to C. "A" was the high-
est rating, B-plus was average, and anything below B-plus was 
less than average. (R. 349) 
F. He further stated that a "B" rated bond was consid-
ered a speculative security. (R. 365) 
9 
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G. Mr. Jeavons testified that Gulton was rated as a B-
minus stock in 1969, with B-plus being average. (R. 363) 
H. Ling Temco Vaught (Bonds) were rated "B" in 
1968, which were speculative (R. 365) 
I. SSP was not rated by Standard and Poors in 1967 
but in 1973 was rated B, which was below average (R. 379) 
J. Adams Millis was a B rated Stock or below average. 
(R. 371) 
K. Gulf & Western was rated B-plus (R. 364) and al-
though Mr. Jevens did not personally recommend this stock 
to his clientele he said it would be a reasonable purchase as 
part of a total portfolio. (R. 364) He stated, however, that it 
was not prudent to hold it in the quantities held due to poor 
diversification (R. 386) 
Mr. Jeavons' integrity and competency were never ques-
tioned during the trial, and his testimony provided substan-
tial unrebutted evidence upon which the trial court could 
make its decision, and in the event this court should find 
that there was an improper taking of judicial notice, such 
error would not be prejudicial to the Appellants. 
THIRD: Appellant contends that the trial Court could 
not take judicial notice of how conglomerate corporations 
do business. This Court however took judicial notice of the 
manner of conducting business by building and loan associa-
tions as follows: 
"While the particular methods followed by the plaint-
iff in its transactions with its members are not set 
forth, yet we may take judicial notice of the general 
purpose of such associations, and, in a general way 
at least, are charged with knowledge of their meth-
ods of conducting business." 
Union Savings and Investment Co. vs. District Court of Salt 
10 
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Lake County, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 2d 221, at 224 (1914). 
This Court has further stated its position on this subject 
by quoting, with approval, Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. 
Sec. 2555 and 2567 as follows: 
"That a matter is judicially noticed means merely 
that it is taken as true without the offering of proof 
by the party who should ordinarily have done so. 
This is because the Court assumes that the matter 
is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But the 
opponent is not prevented from disputing the mat-
ter by evidence, if he believes it disputable." State 
vs. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P2d 600 (1951) (Em-
phasis added) 
As further authority we sight Patterson v. Wilcox 11 Utah 
2d 264, 358 P2d 88, at 90 (1961), in which this Court took 
knowledge of the arrival of the atomic age and the manners 
in which the U. S. Government had pre-empted the production 
and consumption of fissionable ores. Also see Brut v. Wool-
sulate 106 Utah 156, 146 P.2d 203 1944), in which this Court 
took knowledge of who the moving forces were behind the 
passage of the Fair Trade Acts. 
It should also be kept in mind that the purchase of con-
glomerates was only one of the reasons for the losses incur-
red. The losses were also a result of the failure to diversify 
and the large purchases of conglomerates on margin. 
The case at bar was tried to the Court without a jury 
and this was the trial Court's opinion as to the nature of con-
glomerates. The Court further offered the Appellants the 
opportunity by brief to dispute these facts (R. 567), but the 
Appellants failed to do so. In fact, even on appeal the ap-
pellants do not say that the trial Court's analysis was wrong, 
they merely say he shouldn't have made such an analysis. 
11 
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P O I N T III 
THE PURPORTED RELEASE OF WILLIAM BOWMAN 
IS NO DEFENSE. 
At issue in the case was the effect, if any, of the docu-
ment entitled "Release and Confirmation" (Ex. 6) signed by 
William H. Bowman, plaintiff's father, and by appellants on 
or about May 4, 1970. This was three (3) weeks before Wil-
liam H. Bowman's death (R. 423). The trial court (R. 195) 
found it ineffective for any purpose. 
A. THE RELEASE WAS NOT EFFECTIVE EVEN AS 
TO WILLIAM H. BOWMAN. 
This release, typed upon legal stationery of the Dussaults* 
attorneys, recited as consideration the guarantee by John A. 
Dussault of a note and interest No such guarantee was ever 
given. The guarantee actually given ran only to interest, not 
principal (R. 542). In fact, the loan made was from Estelle 
Wattis Bowman trust at Commercial Security Bank, a differ-
ent trust from the Marie Dorothy Wattis trust. The funds 
loaned were not the Dussaults' and the guarantee, effective 
only as to interest, was never called for payment (R. 472, 
Ex. 7). There was no consideration to support the release. 
Another reason preventing this release from being effec-
tive as to William H. Bowman was the circumstance of duress 
under which it was given. The record showed that for a num-
ber of years there was feuding between Dussaults and the 
William Bowman family (R. 428, 510, 546). Thus Dussault 
testified that when William Bowman approached them for 
a loan they knew that Bowman was desperate for money and 
was in some type of deep trouble in Ogden. Although they 
did not know the exact nature of the problem, it was appar-
ent the money sought was necessary for the survival of Wil-
liam Bowman (R. 510, 578, 546). Under these circumstances 
12 
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Bowman would have signed a release, a deed to the island 
of Manhattan, or any thing else the Dussaults requested in 
return for consent to the bank to make a loan to him from his 
mother's trust. It can hardly be said this was a transaction 
between a knowledgeable attorney interested in the effect 
of his signature; rather, it was simply a matter of signing 
anything that was put in front of him in order to get the 
Twenty-Five Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollar loan. 
B. IN NO EVENT WILL THE WILLIAM BOWMAN RE-
LEASE BAR THESE PLAINTIFFS. 
It is not disputed that a trust beneficiary may, after prop-
er review of information and upon a knowledgeable and free 
from duress situation, release a claim against a trustee. How-
ever, the plaintiffs here are suing in their own right as bene-
ficiaries under the trust of Marie Dorothy Wattis. 
William Bowman had no rights that he could effectively 
release other than perhaps a personal right to make specific 
charges. This was a spend-thrift trust with a restriction on 
alienation or assignment (R. 7). Appellants do not cite any 
authority to the effect that one beneficiary can alienate or 
foreclose another beneficiary's right to challenge a transac-
tion. In fact, the opposite is true as illustrated by the Restate-
ment of Trusts, Section 216 G). 
"If there are several beneficiaries, whether con-
current or successive, the consent of one of them to 
a deviation from the terms of the trust does not pre-
clude the other beneficiaries from holding the trustee 
liable for breach of trust so far as their interests are 
concerned . . . Thus, if a trust is created for one ben-
eficiary for life and another in remainder, and the 
life beneficiary consents to an investment which is 
not a proper trust investment and the remainderman 
does not consent, and a loss occurs, the trustee is 
under a duty to the remainderman to dispose of the 
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improper investment and to make good the loss by 
making payment into the trust of the amount of the 
loss, but the trustee is entitled to take and retain 
for himself during the life of the life beneficiary the 
income received on the amount of the loss so re-
paid." 
"One cestui cannot effect another beneficiary's 
rights in this regard, for example consent to a non-
legal investment by a life tenant cestui has no bear-
ing upon the ability of the remainderman cestui to 
complain." 
Scott on Trusts, third edition section 216.2: 
"If there are several beneficiaries, the consent 
of one of them to an act or omission of the trustee 
does not preclude the other beneficiaries from hold-
ing the trust liable for breach of trust to their in-
terest." 
Mclnnes vs. Whitman, Massachusetts 1943, 46 Northeast 
ern Second 527: "Where part of the beneficiaries consent to 
the retention of non-legals the other beneficiaries are not af-
fected in their right to hold the trustee liable." See also 
International Trust vs. Preston, Wyoming, 156 Pacific 1128 
and St Germaine vs. Tuttle, Vermont, 44 Atlantic Second, 137. 
As found by the court the release here in question was 
not effective (R. 581). Scott on Trusts, section 216.3 states 
a ratification between a trustee and a beneficiary is not an 
arms-lengh transaction; if there is any unfairness involved, 
it will be promptly set aside. 
Appellants argued that the plaintiffs here were in priv-
ity with William Bowman, but the fact is that each and both 
were contingent beneficiaries. If William Bowman survived 
his mother, the plaintiffs here would have no right under 
the trust instrument. If William Bowman did not survive his 
mother, he would have nothing and all rights would belong 
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to these plaintiffs. That is actually what happened since Wil-
liam Bowman predeceased his mother and any purported re-
lease extracted from Bowman during a desperate economic 
situation is no bar against these plaintiffs or any of their com-
plaints. 
P 0 I N T IV. 
JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED AGAINST DE-
FENDANTS ON THE RENO RANCH TRANSACTION 
In 1961 Mrs. Bowman and John Dussault exchanged prop-
erties by way of an even trade. The Trial Court upon extens-
ive documentary evidence and testimony entered judgment 
against Dussault for the plaintiff's one-third share of the dis-
parity in value between the two properties at the time of the 
trade. Appellants launch several attacks upon this result and 
we will attempt to meet these arguments in the manner ad-
vanced. 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT JOHN 
DUSSAULT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MRS. BOW-
MAN IN THE 1961 TRANSACTION. 
A. John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault were at the 
time of such transaction trustees under the Marie Dorothy 
Wattis Trust. 
B. Mrs. Bowman loved and relied upon John Dussault 
to advise her in the conduct of her affairs (R. 250, 445), mak-
ing loans of large sums of money to the Dussaults and en-
trusting monies to John Dussault for investment purposes 
(R. 250, 261, 319, 320). 
C. By reason of the foregoing John Dussault in fact 
occupied a confidential and fiduciary relationship to Mrs. 
Bowman in 1961 and thereafter. 
D. The exchange was not, as painted by appellants, 
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simply a deal whereby Mrs. Bowman and John Dussault ex-
changed property, and thereafter John Dussault was fortu-
nate to find a sale for his newly acquired property at more 
than it was worth. This was a simultaneous transaction with 
John Dussault having the Reno Ranch sold before he ever 
traded Mrs. Bowman for it (R. 336, 397). (Robinson Dep. 
page 8; Exs. L, 0, 8, and 18). The Airport Road parcel re-
ceived by Mrs. Bowman and the trust was then worth $95,-
800.00 (Ex. M). No additional consideration was paid by John 
Dussault to Mrs. Bowman or the trust for the Reno Ranch 
(R. 322). Dussault simultaneously sold the Reno Ranch prop-
erty to Dr. Mullis for a sum between $120,000.00 (Ex. 8) and 
$190,000.00 (Mullis Dep. page 5). The trial court in fact re-
solved this dollar conflict in the Dussaults' favor as the judg-
ment could have been based upon the $190,000 figure Dr. 
Mullis testified to. As to the true value of the land it should 
be noted that the Reno Ranch property consisted of some 
80 acres (Mullis Dep. page 5), whereas the Airport Road prop-
erty was simply a commercial lot with a cinder block build-
ing on it that was used for mobile home and trailer sales. 
Shortly prior to the trial of this case Dr. Mullis had sold the 
Reno Ranch properties for in excess of $900,000.00 (Mullis 
Dep. page 10). 
We have, therefore, not an armslength transaction where 
both parties are equally informed, or a matter involving a 
representation or opinion of value that may or may not be 
actionable. We have Mrs. Bowman relying completely upon 
John Dussault who traded her property and realized at least 
$24,800.00 in a simultaneous transaction without her knowl-
edge. The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for one-third 
of that value is well founded upon the evidence. 
2. THE ISSUE WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
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The Reno Ranch issue was not spelled out in the original 
complaint as plaintiffs were unaware of the facts it involv-
ed. However, two pre-trials were held in this action, Febru-
ary 7th and March 14th, 1973. The issues were defined at 
pre-trial conferences and a pre-trial order (R. 116) was en-
tered by Judge Calvin Gould. Over one page of the Order 
dealt exclusively with the Reno Ranch allegations and issues 
(R. 119). Appellants contentions following entry of the pre-
trial order was set out in a two-page document entitled Pre-
Trial Order (R. 113) containing eleven separate claims or 
defenses. Nowhere did Appellants ever claim, until this ap-
peal, the matter was not properly raised. 
The averments of fraud were specified in the pre-trial 
order with particularity far beyond the mandate of Rule 9(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The issues fixed in the pre-
trial order governed trial of the case: Rule 16 U.R.C.P. in 
part reads as follows: 
"The court shall make an order which recites the 
action taken at the conference, the amendments al-
lowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made 
by the parties as to any of the matters considered, 
and which limits the issues for trial to those not dis-
posed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; 
and such order when entered controls the subse-
quent course of action, unless modified at the trial 
to prevent manifest injustice." (Emphasis added.) 
Citizens Casualty Company of New York vs. Hackett 17 Utah 
2nd, page 304, 410 Pacific 2nd 767: 
"The pre-trial order controls the issues of the case 
where it is made without objection and no motion 
is made to change it, unless it is modified at the 
trial to prevent a manifest injustice." 
To the same effect is Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Sales 
vs. Lords, 23 Utah 2nd 152, 460 Pacific 2nd Page 321. The 
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record is clear the pre-trial order was entered without ob-
jection and no motion at trial was made for a modification. 
3. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO ATTACK THE 
RENO RANCH TRANSACTION. 
The plaintiffs in this action are one-third beneficiaries 
under the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust as well as one-third 
beneficiaries under the personal trust of Mrs. Bowman lodg-
ed at Commercial Security Bank (Ex. 7). The gifts made by 
Mrs. Bowman during her lifetime (Ex. 2) were one-third to 
each child including plaintiffs' father. No executor or admin-
istrator was ever appointed. 
Heirs (plaintiffs) may sue with respect to the ancestor's 
real or personal property, In Re Voorhee's Estate, 8 Utah 2nd 
231, 332 Pacific 2nd 670. 
The Airport Road property now in the trust was deed-
ed to the trust directljr from Mrs. Bowman during her life-
time (Ex. 1). This was after she acquired the property from 
John Dussault in exchange for her Reno Ranch property. The 
Trial Court found the trust had thereby suffered the loss of 
$24,200.00; i.e., if the transaction had not been made the trust 
would have received the more valuable Reno Ranch property. 
Such finding is amply supported by the evidence. Whether 
the loss was technically to the trust or to the remaining es-
tate of Mrs. Bowman at Commercial Security Bank does not 
deprive plaintiffs of standing to complain. Either by way of 
loss to the trust or loss to themselves as heirs of Estella Wat-
tis Bowman, plaintiffs are entitled to recover such loss. This 
loss does not abate upon death of Mrs. Bowman as it con-
stitutes in effect an injury to property or estate. 75-11-5, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides for the survival of any action found-
ed upon contract. The instant case, although having the ele-
ments of fraud involved, was founded upon the contract 
which involved the simultaneous exchange of the properties. 
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Further, 75-11-7 U.C.A. 1953, specifically provides that any 
action against a deceased person for the taking away or de-
struction of personal property does survive. This was con-
firmed in a tort action against a bank director for negligent 
loss of funds, Warren vs. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 Pacific 
28. The import of these statutes and decisions is that an ac-
tion, when it involves property and contract rights, does sur-
vive. The executor or administrator of Estella Wattis Bow-
man could have brought an action to recover this loss. As 
there was no executor or administrator and all of the prop-
erty was disposed of through gifts and through trusts involv-
ed, under the doctrine of In Re Voorhee's Estate, supra, plaint-
iffs have standing to recover for the damage to the property 
and estate of their ancestor. 
The court, however, went further than holding simply 
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court specifical-
ly found that the trust estate itself, the Marie Dorothy Wat-
is Trust, had suffered this particular loss by reason of the 
exchange of properties, with the resulting lowered value prop-
erty being placed in the trust rather than the higher valued 
Reno Ranch property. 
4. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR 
THIS ACTION. 
We should point out that the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense and must be raised by pleading. Rule 
9(h) U.R.C.P. It is to be noted the list of appellants conten-
tions in the pre-trial order (R. 113) contained no reference 
to statute of limitations. 
At the time of the 1961 property exchange the three 
trustees of the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust were Mrs. Bowman, 
John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault. The court found, sup-
ported entirely by the evidence, that Mrs. Bowman never be-
came aware of the true facts regarding the disparate values 
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of the two properties (R. 197). The other two trustees were 
the beneficiaries of the transaction and obviously the trust 
was unable to take any action to recover its loss until the 
plaintiffs became aware of the true facts and were able to 
launch this attack upon the dealing. The plaintiffs were the 
first people with true interest and ability to challenge this 
transaction. The plaintiffs did promptly pursue their reme-
dy when they became aware of it. 
The statute of limitations in Nevada is similar to Utah 
(R. 178) with regard to a claim for misleading or self-dealing. 
The cause of action is tolled until the aggrieved party becomes 
aware of the wrong, 78-12-26 (3) U.C.A., 1953. The specifi-
cations as above pointed out were completely contained in 
the pre-trial order and therefore the court was correct in 
concluding that the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run during the lifetime of Mrs. Bowman as she was never 
aware of the facts prior to the time she became incapaci-
tated. 
P O I N T V. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSESSED DAMAGES 
Prominent in the opinions of this court we find a maxim 
that facts will be reviewed on appeal in the light most favor-
able to the prevailing party. Notwithstanding, appellants state 
(App. Brief pg. 4) the attorney who drafted the trust agree-
ment orally assured Dussault there would be no personal 
liability. This claim is made despite documentary evidence 
in the record (Ex. 8) from the same attorney to Dussault as 
follows: 
"With respect to the formation of the trusts our 
notes do not show any intent to deviate from nor-
mal investment policy excepting only the special 
provision relating to stock in Utah Construction Com-
pany above noted." 
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Appellants claim Mrs. Bowman had the right to govern 
the trust and to take the entire corpus of the trust (App. 
Brief pg. 6). To the contrary is the trust document itself (R. 
3) and the trial court's findings from the evidence (R. 191) 
that the life beneficiary, Mrs. Bowman, "was not clothed with 
power to invade the trust". 
Next, we meet the assertion Dussault was not aware and 
was never warned of the risks associated with margin invest-
ment (App. Brief pgs. 7, 8); further, that Attorney Bridges 
authorized margin investment in his discussion with Dussault. 
Yet Dussault testified Bridges never discussed margin in-
vestment with him (R. 450) and under no strain of interpreta-
tion could the Bridges' letter be so read. Further, Robert Jeav-
ons, an eminently qualified trust investment officer, testified 
that margin investment was never proper in trust portfolios 
(R. 354); in fact, it is a practice prohibited by the Comptroller 
of the Currency (R. 390). Despite his well advertised sixth 
grade education, the Dussault in control of this trust was 
an intelligent and hard businessman. In 1969 he personally 
(as opposed to the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust) sold 
over one million dollars of securities (Ex. S) and 
in 1970 gained more than six hundred thousand dollars from 
the sale of one security alone. In light of all the evidence, 
the trial court found (R. 191) Dussault was a man knowledge-
able about diversification requirements; he knew speculative in-
vestments from proper ones for trust purposes, and that he had 
the ability during the times here in question to properly man-
age the trust estate. 
The trial court findings further outline that Dussault 
from 1966 on made no accountings to any knowledgeable 
person, that he speculated with the trust funds for his own 
purposes and advantage, that he did not diversify and extens-
ively used margin purchases (R. 193). This indictment is not 
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subject to dispute or controversy. The trust itself is a profes-
sionally drawn, complete document. It contains no absolution 
from liability; certainly, if Marie Dorothy Wattis had wished 
it, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson and Bridges would have proper-
ly and appropriately so provided. Dussault testified at some 
length as to the time he spent reading, analyzing and getting 
advice on his duties under the trust investment (App. Brief 
pg. 7). He must have been familiar therefore with the first 
declaration as to the purpose of the trust itself (R. 3): 
' . . . for the purposes of management of her prop-
erty and estate with greater personal ease and free-
dom during her lifetime and conservation of the same 
for final distribution after her death . . ." (Empha-
sis added) 
The testimony as to mismanagement of the trust during 
this critical period is unopposed. Appellants called no witness 
to challenge the testimony of Robert Jeavons, the expert wit-
ness with a lifetime background in trust management prac-
tices. This witness, Mr. Jeavons, outlined the duties of a trus-
tee under the prudent man rule recognized in all states (R. 
352). These duties include conservation, diversification, no 
speculation, and no margin buying, all the exact opposite of 
what actually happened. Appellants seemed to assert this was 
merely an "aggressive" portfolio and as such was within dis-
cretionary limits. However, the brutal import of the Jeavons 
testimony and the documents in the record are: 
Margin investment is never proper in trust management 
(R. 354, 390). 
Diversification is demanded; in a trust the size of this one 
preferably 15 to 20 issues, but in no event less than 10 (R. 
354). 
Interests of all beneficiaries, not merely the life tenant, 
must be considered and protected by the trustee (R. 353). 
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Speculative stocks are not proper investment for trus-
tees (R. 355). A maximum of 20 per cent of the portfolio 
could be invested in good grade speculative stocks. 
The 1968, 1969 and 1970 conduct of the trustees here 
involved violated the prudent man rules (R. 386). 
Of the stock held by the trust in the years 1968 through 
1971 most were improper for trust investment because they 
were speculative, low rated stocks not even suitable for a 
small portion of the trust estate (R. 391). 
The years 1968 through 1970 were a period of rising 
prices and good market conditions. Most trust portfolios show^ -
ed marked improvement in their asset picture during these 
three years in question (R. 356). 
The law appears clear that a trustee who violates his 
duty cannot reduce the amount of liability by deducting a 
gain which accrued in a separate transaction, whether proper 
or improper. An illustration given in the Restatement of 
Trusts, second edition, section 213 (A) is as follows: 
"Thus, if the trustee improperly invests part 
of the trust funds in securities which he sells at a 
profit, and improperly invests another part of the 
trust funds in other securities which he sells at a loss, 
the beneficiary can accept the transaction on which 
there was a profit and reject that on which there was 
a loss." 
Professor Scott endorses this rule. He indicates that it is not 
logical to allow the trustees to benefit by reason of profits that 
belong to the trust. He states further that if the rule were oth-
erwise, the temptation would be for any trustee who has im-
properly invested to continue to do the same thing. This is 
because if he did further speculate and was lucky enough to 
make a profit, he would then in effect exonerate himself from 
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the first improper transaction. Scott, third edition sec-
tion 213.1: 
"A common situation is that which arises where 
the trustee makes several improper trust investments 
with the trust property, some of which result in a 
profit and others in a loss. In such cases where the 
investments are separate the beneficiary can accept 
those in which there was a profit and hold the trus-
tee liable for the loss on the others. It is immaterial 
that the result of all the breaches of trust may be a 
gain to the trust." 
Professor Bogert and his work on trusts and trustees, section 
708, is highly critical of the Mclnnes case cited at some length 
in this area by appellants. An illustration used by Bogert is 
as follows: 
"Thus, if he as the trustee purchases at differ-
ent times two separate unlawful investments the first, 
a bond on which there is a loss of $500 and the sec-
ond, shares of stock which are sold at a profit of 
$500, the trustee cannot relieve himself of the lia-
bility with regard to the bond investment by show-
ing he gained an equal amount in regard to the un-
lawful stock investment. He is liable for the $500 lost 
on the bond and the trust estate gets advantage of the 
$500 gain on the stock transaction." 
Cases refusing to offset losses against gains are Vest vs. 
Bialson, Missouri, 1956, 293 Southwestern Second 369, Creed 
vs. McAleer, Massachusetts, 175 Northeast 761, City Bank 
Farmers Trust vs. Evans, 5 New York Supplement Second, 406, 
Penn Company vs. Gilmore, New Jersey, 1948, 59 Atlantic 
Second 24, and Bottcher vs. Bartling, Nebraska, 1948, 31 
Northwestern Second 422. 
Appellants brief attempts to show that profits made by 
the trust in separate years and separate transactions were ac-
tually not distinct from the losses and therefore should be 
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offset. It should be noted each citation by appellants in sup-
port of this draws a very clear distinction between separate 
transactions and transactions which took place at the same 
time. The ilustration used by the Restatement and set out in 
page 42 of Appellants brief says a purchase of different se-
curities must all be made at the same time in order to be con-
sidered as one transaction rather than separate transactions. 
Similarly, the illustration from Professor Bogert on page 43 
of Appellants brief makes the identical requirement that the 
purchase of speculative stocks must be at one time and from 
one seller in order not to be considered distinct transactions. 
Does the record here show separate distinct transactions 
or one transaction? The brief claims profits of some two hun-
dred thousand dollars made earlier should be offset against 
the enormous losses that were realized later. The profits made 
prior to 1967 were modest and realized as the result of sale 
of the original conservative investments held by the trustees 
from the investment policies of the Crocker Bank. See Exhi-
bits F, E, and the 1965 and 1966 audit reports contained in 
Exhibit C. 
The only real question of offset would lie with the prof-
its made by the sale of Gulf and Western stock in the year 
1967. This resulted in a gain of some one hundred ninety 
eight thousand dollars. This gain also resulted in an obligation 
of sixty eight thousand dollars in tax obligations; the net gain 
to the Trust was not two hundred thousand but some one 
hundred thirty thousand. (1967 aduit report contained in Ex. 
C.) This 1967 profit originated in two 1965 purchases on sepa-
rate occasions of New Jersey Zinc stock, later acquired by 
Gulf and Western, and a 1966 Trust purchase of Gulf and 
Western. (Ex. N and Ex. D pg. 1). Far from being part of 
a simultaneous transaction, the losses that we are here con-
cerned with resulted from huge margin purchases made prin-
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cipally in the spring of 1968 and 1969 (Exs. D and F). The 
gain and loss purchases therefore were made some two or 
three years apart. Additionally, the gain purchases were made 
at a time the trust began to use the margin. The loss pur-
chases were made later, at a time of complete lack of diver-
sification and runaway use of margin accounts, which the 
court found resulted in these losses. It is also to be noted that 
these loss purchases were all made after the court found that 
life tenant and trustee, Estella Wattis Bowman, was incompe-
tent and the sole control was invested with the Dussaults. 
For instance, in 1966 when the investment was made that re-
sulted in the hundred and ninety eight thousand dollar prof-
it, the use of margin was only at some thirteen per cent (R. 
391). By contrast, in 1968 and 1969 the margin was up to 
eighty per cent (R. 391). The gross condition of borrowing 
and lack of diversification is brought into sharp detail by 
the balance sheet of February 18, 1969, reflecting the condi-
tion of the trust as of December 31, 1968 (Ex. C). 
DECEMBER 31, 1968 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
Shares Cost Market 
S. S. P. Industries 6,000 $104,506 $ 84,000 
Gulf & Western 4,500 349,678 373,500 
Cash 12,224 12,224 
Real Property (Reno) 51,039 51,039 
$517,447 $520,763 
LESS 
Security Deposit 3,000 3,000 
Stockbrokers (Margin Account) 211,321 211,321 
$214,321 $214,321 
NET ASSETS $303,126 $306,442 
*NOTE: 
By contrast; the assets of the estate as of October 11, 
1971, time of proposed distribution, were the Reno 
Real Property, $6,620.91 in cash, and the same S.S.P. 
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stock, then worth only $45,000. (Ex. C) 
Here we see the net value of the trust (including the land 
in Reno) to be three hundred and six thousand dollars. Yet, 
at that same time the trust had invested in a single security, 
Gulf and Western, three hundred and forty-nine thousand dol-
lars. To accomplish this, borrowing well in excess of two hun-
dred thousand dollars was necessary. The trust at that time 
contained only two securities, a violation of the diversifica-
tion rule indicated by Robert Jeavons, rather than the mini-
mum of ten or the preferred amount of 15 to 20 in a trust of 
this size. 
The findings of the court did not assess damage for ev-
ery loss incured during this period of time. The trust lost 
some sixty thousand dollars from an investment in six thous-
and shares of S.S.P. Industries. This stock was distributed di-
rectly out of the trust in kind and so was not reflected in 
any tax schedule of gains and losses contained in Exhibit D. 
However, the loss was real and was incurred by the trust and 
is reflected in the balance sheet of October 11, 1971 contain-
ed in exhibit C. The court, however, in its findings did not 
assess any damage from this, indicating it felt it was proper 
and not without the bounds of a trustee's duty to invest a 
small portion of a family trust in good stock even though 
speculative in nature, such as S.S.P. (R 196). It should be 
noted that part of the damages assessed were not simply loss-
es realized on the sale of the property, but some thirty seven 
thousand dollars that was paid during this three year period 
in interest on the margin account. Since the margin invest-
ment was improper, certainly this interest payment was a 
loss to the trust and properly included in addition to losses 
from stock transactions. 
This case indicates an almost unbelievable flight of spe-
culation by a trustee with no concern for the other people 
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in interest and particularly these plaintiffs. As 
Judge Wahlquist noted, the plaintiffs and these defendants 
inhabited entirely different worlds of needs. A loss to these 
defendants was more in the nature of a tax balancing situa-
tion rather than any out-of-pocket real life loss. The converse 
was true, however, both as to William Bowman as plaintiffs' 
father, and these plaintiffs themselves. Their interest demand-
ed preserving the estate, not destroying it in an attempt to 
realize speculative profits. Plaintiffs were never consulted or 
even considered in this program that devastated the trust es-
tate, all in direct violation of trustors' expressed desire for 
the conservation of the estate for distribution. Under the facts 
and record of this case it would be grossly unfair to allow these 
trustees to offset the 1968 through 1970 huge losses of this 
estate with the gains that were in fact realized by purchases 
some years earlier, at a different point in time, in differ-
ent situations, and when trustees still had some contact with 
and accounting to Mrs. Bowman. Judgment should be affirm-
ed in all respects. 
P O I N T V I 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DONALD BOWMAN IS 
FINAL. 
The defendant Donald Bowman has never filed a Notice 
of Appeal from the judgment entered against him in the Dis-
trict Court on March 5, 1974. By reason thereof the judgment 
is now final and this court is without jurisdiction to in any 
manner alter or reverse such judgment. Rule 73 U.R.C.P. 
and Ratliff, Estate of vs. Conrad, 19 Utah Second 346,431 Pa-
cific Second 571. Allen vs. Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 Pacific 228. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the record of malfeasance by 
appellants was overwhelming. The 1938 trust instrument 
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evidences no intent to insulate Trustees from liability for 
the wild speculations they indulged in during the late 1960's. 
No testimony contradicted Mr. Jeavons analysis of their 
actions. The judgment should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
H. DON SHARP 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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